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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, by and through
its ROAD COl\Il\IISSION,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

REED E. LARKIN AND DARDA
G. LARKIN, his wife; FEDERAL
LAND BANK OF BERKELEY;
FRED E. KEELER II,
Defendants-Respondents.

Case No.
12537

Brief of Defendants-Respondents

NATURE OF CASE
Defendants adopt plaintiff's statement.
DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT
Defendants adopt plaintiff's statement on page two
of its said brief and in addition allege: That during the
argument of plaintiff before the jury the plaintiff all

leged that the reduction of defendant:/ land was so minor
that it would not affect their livestock operation. That
the defendants in their argument argued to the jury the
percentages of reduction of land and how it would affect
their livestock operation. Statements of proceedings by
each party were filed and the court made an order pertaining thereto.
RELIEF SOUGHT 0:\1" APPEAL
To have the jury's verdict as to the severance damages of $3,040.00 less benefits of $540.00 leaving a net
of $2,500.00 for severance damages upheld.

STATElHENT OF FACTS
This is a condemnation by the plaintiff to take
79.493 acres of land from the defendants.
The defendants were the owners of a total of 640
acres of land from which the land herein referred to was
taken. Most of the land had been planted to mountain
grasses for livestock feed for use in the fall and early
spring. A creek of water sometimes called "Deep Creek"
located to the south of the land taken, furnished water
for the livestock when they were pasturing on this land.
The land taken was to be used for the new freeway
I-15 and in making overpasses to bring old U.S. 30,
which coursed east and west, around and over I-15 as it
went on a curve to the northwest out of the defendants'
2

property. The construction necessitated the making of
large fills toward the westerly side of I-15 leaving an
isolated tract to the westerly end between U.S. 30 and
1-15 of 17.95 acres. Also the lands left isolated on the
northeast side were 44.93 acres. The isolated tracts had
no water and could no longer be used for livestock grazing. The trucking of water would be too costly to justify
the same.
The 17.95 acre tract was left so that it appeared to
be located in a huge depression due to the fill that was
hauled in so as to elevate the Highway U.S. 30 (15 feet
on easterly side) (Tr. 135, line 18) so as to cross over
I-15. The only convenient access to this tract was in the
extreme southwest of the same and at an approximate
elevation of 5 feet (Tr. 135 line 25). The other isolated
tract of 44.93 acres could be reached from Highway
U.S. 30. The remaining lands of the defendants on the
south side could be reached only by two alternative
routes. Either the defendants would have to cross over
the freeway on U.S. 30 toward the west end of defendants' property, continue west down the grades of the
overpass until they reached an elevation where a turn-off
could be made or they could, at a point just west of
Snowville, approximately a mile and a half east of defendants' property, cross under I-15 to the cattle trail on
the south side of I-15 and follow it down approximately
1
miles to the east property line on the south side.
The land taken, plus the isolated tracts, made a
total of 142.373 acres that were taken out of use to the
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defendants in their cattle operation in this particular 040
acre tract. Any prospective purchaser of this property,
after the taking, had problems of two routes while there
was only one before. After the taking there was dry
mountain ground in one isolated tract with no water
available and another isolated small parcel which appeared to be in a hole or depression also without water.
The two parcels were too small to attempt to stock with
livestock and graze and hauling of water to livestock was
not economically feasible. The land remaining on the
south was reduced in size which would of necessity either
reduce the number of head of livestock that could be run
upon it for a given time or reduce the time for the same
number of livestock. There was no other land available
that could be purchased with water in this vicinity to take
its place (Tr. 141, line 9). Its highest and best use, with
the lfrestock water available, was as a pasture with livestock in an agricultural pursuit, and all witnesses agreed
on this.

POINT I
THE COURT DID NOT REFUSE TO ALLOW
PLAINTIF:F TO OFFER EVIDENCE OF
SALES OF COJVIPARABLE PROPERTY JlUT
IN ITS DISCRETION DENIED PLAINTIFF
THE RIGHT TO OFFER EVIDENCE o:F
SALES THAT 'VERE NOT COMPARABLE;
THOSE OFFERED BEING TO REMOTE.
The property in question is approximately l l/2
miles west of Snowville. At Snowville there is a well
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established clover leaf for on or off traffic. There is only
an occasional house to the west of the property in question along Highway 30. The nearest settlement along
Highway 30 would be Park Valley, approximately 40
miles, having a population of 25. To the northwest along
I-15 the nearest town of any consequence would be
Ilurley, Idaho. To the east ll/2 miles would be Snowville
Town, with a population of 174 people. Going east another 35 miles is Tremonton with a population of 2,794,
then south to Brigham City, a distance of 20 miles, with
a population of 14,007 people.
At Snowville, Utah, there is a full provision made
for the travelers to get on and off 1-15, conveniently at
this location. Also, according to the State's witness J. R.
'Vindley, there would be erected east and west of the
Snowville Town turn-off, at the expense of the State of
Utah, signs giving the distance to Snowville stating:
"All services available at Snowville." (Tr. 138 lines 310).

The plaintiff, in its endeavor to avoid any severance
damage to the defendants on account of the road bisecting their property and making three independent tracts
of land, less two highways, from that which was just one
tract before, had its first witness, Victor M. Smith, testify (Tr.149line26):
"Any off ramp site on the federal highway, the
interstate system, is potentially a commercial site."
He also testified that in his opinion there were two sites
aYailahle of three acres each with a value of $1,500.00 per
5

acre or a total of $9,000.00 less the value of the lan<l before taking, making a net increase of $8,586.00 (Tr. 157
lines 1-15) and further testified that the increase he gave
per acre would off-set any severance damages. The only
comparable he offered was a option obtained by a _l\;fr.
Walker to purchase l l/2 acres at the Snowville interchange with a certain owner of property at said place
calling for the payment of $800.00 total or $555.00 per
acre if it were exercised. (Tr. 151-152).
Mr. Cain, another of plaintiff's witnesses, was more
eager to avoid any potential severance damages of the
defendants by great extravagant claims of increase in
value of certain portions of the lands remaining after the
take. He testified that the northwest portion, in pink,
and the northeast portion, in pink, would increase in
value (Tr. 184 lines 19, 20 and 21). He said, (Tr. 185
line 12):
"I felt in the after condition this ground, the
17.95 acres would sell for $2,500.00 per acre .... "
giving a benefit for the tract of $43,798.00 (Tr. 185 line
27). He said the other tract of 44 acres in the northeast
portion would sell for $500.00 per acre (Tr. 186 lines
5-10) and the benefit from this would be $20,796.00 (Tr.
186 line 20). Up to this point Mr. Cain, the State's witness, offered no comparable sales to justify his extravagant claims. He was asked on cross examination if he
knew of any person who would pay these large prices he
talked about (Tr. 188 lines 6-12) and he said:
"No, sir, I do not."

6

On further redirect the attorney for the State asked (Tr.
188 lines 14-19) :
''llY .l\IR. EV ANS: Q. Mr. Cain, do you know
anybody that's made any offers for that property?

A. Yes, sir.
Q. 'V ould you tell us about them?

A. I made an offer to Mr. Larkin out on the property for the northwestly piece myself."
His offer was $100.00 per acre (Tr. 189 lines 3 to 25)
not $2,500.00.
On further redirect by Mr. Evans (Tr. 189 line 25)
he was asked if he had checked comparable sales and he
said he had. He then recited a sale on the interchange at
Brigham, one at the Elwood interchange (between
Brigham and Tremonton) and one on the west interchange of Tremonton and one at the interchange of
Honeyville (between Brigham City and Tremonton)
(Tr. 190). All of these sales are from 35 to 55 miles
away from the subject property and in the only area in
Box Elder County that has any degree of population.
These were objected to as being too remote to be comparable. The court then asked the witness: "Are those all
the sales you have"? He answered: "These are the sales
I've used, yes, sir." The court then sustained the objection and held they were not comparable (Tr. 191 lines
1-7).

Now, from this evidence, which included the statement by Mr. Cain, that he knew no one who would pay
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anything for this property but that he would pay $100.00
per acre for the 17.95 acres and also that the land before
taking had a value of $70.00 per acre, the jury then,
when they deliberated, found that the 17.95 acres had
increased in value $30.00 per acre and charged the defendant, Reed Larkin, with $540.00 increase in value
and offset it against the severance damage.
The jury did what any fair minded person would
do. When the appraiser said: "If I were to buy it and I
now am willing to buy it, I will give you $100.00 per
acre," they apparently believed the true value to be equal
to the price that the appraiser said he would pay for that
piece of property. They apparently concluded: "How
can we believe what you say when what you will do
speaks so loudly?" This $100.00 offer was accepted by
the jury. There were only two comparable sales that
were in existence in the area. One consisted of an offer
made by Carl Cobia for two acres at $250.00 per acre in
the 17.95 acre tract (Tr. 51 lines 17 and 18). The other
was the option of Snowville Interchange for $555.00 per
acre for llh acres (Tr. 152 line 7). The State's witness
said he would pay $100.00 per acre for the 17 .95 acres,
which represented a bigger increase in value that the
$250.00 per acre for two acres. The jury accepted it,
but rejected his wild statement that the 17.95 acre tract
was worth $2,500.00 per acre and the north tract of 44
acres was worth $500.00 per acre.
This writer does not take opposition to any of the
cases cited in regard to the theory of comparable sales
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quoted on page 10 of appellant's brief. What this writer
does take exception to is the theory that a sale in an industrial area is comparable with the desert land west of
Snowville Town. If his theory is correct, then he would
also be able to proceed into the Ogden and Salt Lake
areas and pick up and show sales there. The court had
been out with the jury and attorneys to view the site
prior to trial. He used his discretion in making his ruling.
He used good judgment and common sense in his application.
The plaintiff on page 11 of his brief cites Nichols on
Eminent Domain, Volume 5, Article 21.3 ( 3) (3rd Ed.)
pages 21-50, 21-51, and is quoting it to support his theory
that on cross examination he can go far afield and into
sales that are not comparable. Nichols does not say this.
If he had picked up the next paragraph following the
aboYe quote, he would have read the following:
Nichols on Eminent Domain, Volume 5, Article
21.31. Degree of similarity.
"Generally, certain preliminary requirements
must be observed before evidence of comparable
sales mav be adduced. Thus, it must first be demonstrated that the property involved in such sale
is sufficiently similar and proximate to the property in litigation as to be of utility in reflecting
the market value of the latter. Such reflection of
market value is based, of course, on the assumption that the parties to the comparable sale are
informed persons. An isolated sale for a price
seriously out of line with other comparable sales
in the area must be viewed as having little value
in fixing values and must be given little weight.
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"Property similarly situated need not exactlv
conform to the property in suit. When property
on the same or an adjoining street is described as
bearing a close resmblance, or nearly corresponding, to the one in question as to improvements,
size, location, general adaptability, and within the
same business center, it may be said to be similarly situated. There can be no fixed definition of
'similarly situated.' Similarity does not mean
identical, but having a resemblance. Obviously, no
two properties can be exactly alike, and no general rule can be laid down regarding the degree
of similarity that must exist to make such evidence
admissible. It must necessarily vary with the circumstances of each particular case. 'Vhether the
properties are sufficiently similar to have some
bearing on the value under consideration, and to
be of any aid to the jury, must necessarily rest
largely in the sound discretion of the trial court,
which will not be interferred with unless abused.
The exact limits, either of similarity or difference,
or of nearness or remoteness in point of time, is
difficult, if not impossible, to prescribe by any
arbitrary rule, but must to a large extent depend
on the location and the character of the property
and the circumstances of the case. It is to be considered with reference to the light thrown on the
issue, and not as a mere method of raising a legal
puzzle."
Again on the same subject and same book, at pages 2165 to 21-67, we have Article 21.31 ( l) Proximity in
place, as follows:
"The location of the property sold must be considered, and evidence of the price paid at sales of
other land, to be admissible in a land damage case,
must be confined to land similarity situated and
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of the same character as that taken; and, as a general proposition, to land in the same neighborhood .... "
Again, in plaintiff's brief on page 13, appellant seems to
believe that in the course of cross examination a witness
may be examined on sales that are not comparable just
because it is cross examination. A close examination of
the text cited by appellant makes it quite plain that it is
talking about comparable sales of property and not about
property that has no application in regard to being comparable.

POINT II
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING
TO STRIKE
CHAD,VICK'S TESTIMONY.
It was
Chadwick's testimony that a willing buyer and seller of property, both before and after the taking, would consider all of the problems in connection
with the property in arriving at its fair cash market
Yalue.
In doing this he placed a value on the property before the taking and then placed a value on the property
remaining and stated the factors that he thought would
be considered by the buyer and seller of the property
after the taking and with these factors he testified what
he thought the property would sell for.
The attorney for appellant went to great lengths
as shown by part of the quotes in his brief, to try to get
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the appraiser to put values on each of these factors.
'Vhen he was unsuccessful he then moved to strike his
testimony which the court refused to do. The court did,
during one of its recesses, tell Mr. Evans to refer to his
manual which had been prepared in the Attorney General's Office by
Charles l\l. Pickett, Assistant Attorney General and particularly page 86, which is as
follows:

"4. Bisection of a Land Unit with Resulting Inaccessability between the Severed Portions.
Where a non-access highway, either on new location or by virtue of improvement, bisects an economic unit and prevents access between the remaining portions on either side, the general rule
is that denial of access to and between the separated portions of an economic unit caused by the
construction uf a non-access highway is an element of damage for consideration by the jury.
The theory of compensation has no relation to
access to the highway as such; rather, it concerns
damages to the economic unit caused by separation of the unit. In this respect, the jury could
consider such otherwise noncompensable factors
such as circuit;y of travel, inconvenience, and additional cost of operation and functional obsolescence of improvements affecting the same economic unit. Frontage roads, the proximity of interchanges and alternate means of access via intersecting roadways are factors to consider in
mitigation of damages.
Note cases in point listed below.

State v. Clevenger, 291 S.,V.2d 57
1956).
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Belle v. Iowa State Hiyhwa.lJ Commission, 126
N.\V.2d 311 (Iowa 1964).
Lehnum v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 99
N.\V.2d 404 (Iowa 1959).
Arkansas State I-lighwa.lJ Commission v. Union
Planters Bank, 333 S.W.2d 904 (Arkansas
1960).
Chri.Ytensen v. Woodbury Company, 114 N.W.
2d 897 (Iowa 1962).
Cullum v. Van Buren Company, 267 S.W.2d 14
(Arkansas 1954 ) .
Cumrnonwealth v. Burns, 394 S.W.2d 923 (Kentucky 1965) .
State v. Rid,qetcay, 397 S.\V.2d 744 (Missouri
1965).
State v. Meyer, 403 S.\V.2d 366 (Texas 1966).
This land of Mr. Larkin' s had not only been bisected but it had been trisected.

POINT Ill
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING
TO INSTRUCT THE JURY TO DISREGARD
DEFENDANTS' ARGUMENT THAT THE
STATE'S TAKING 1VOULD REDUCE THE
NUMBER OF LIVESTOCK THAT COULD BE
GRAZED ON DEFENDANTS' PROPERTY.
In defendants' answer, paragraph 3 (R. 242) the
defendants set out that the taking in the manner it was
13

taken, without underpasses, will make it impossiLlt: to
graze livestock on certain portions thereof, because the
plaintiff has severed any access to water on portions of
it, and that it would reduce the value of the lands remaining.
In defendants' opening statement (Tr. 26) again
the defendants call or spell out to the jury their theory of
the case, which is: If they take out of production 142.37
acres they take out around 29% of the lands owned in
that section. That in doing so they cut down the producible feed and the amount of livestock that could be operated would have to be reduced or other land found to
take its place, if there is any, all of which would affect
the value of the lands remaining.
When the plaintiff argued to the jury that the taking would not affect the defendants' livestock operation,
a simple calculation based on total acreage and land
taken was made on the blackboard. This was done to
convert the amount of land taken to a percentage and it
was applied to 200 head of cattle to show the effect. It
was never argued that defendants' were damaged 22%.
The court made this amendment to the prepared statement of proceedings (R. 311) which is as follows:
"But not argued that value was reduced 223."
The defendants' attorney then completed his argument
and alleged that production of feed in a livestock operation was important as well as the size of operation and
that willing buyers would consider all factors. The small
amount of severance damage awarded by the jury shows
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Leyond all question of doubt that this argument had no
great effect on the jury.
The testimony as to severance damage of each witness before any offset is as follows:
Exhibit #2 Marcellus Palmer
Exhibit # 3 Don Chadwick
Exhibit # 4 Vic Smith
Exhibit # 5 lVIemory Cain

$5,622.80
$8,029.87
$ 428.80
$1,057.60

The jury's verdict was $3,040.00. The jury was
only within 52% of the defendants' lowest appraiser's
figures and 37% of the defendants' highest appraiser's
figures. The small amount awarded does away with all
arguments that the amount reflected loss of profits from
any livestock operation.
POINT IV
THE COURT DID NOT IMPROPERLY REFUSE TO ALLOW TESTil\'.IONY OF THE RElHO\r AL OF GRAVEL SOLD BY DEFENDANTS TO PLAINTIFF'S CONTRACTORS.
This case was handled like numerous other trials,
that is, attorneys for each side met with the court prior
to the trial to see if there was any possibility of settlement. Also, to see if there were any ground rules which
could be decided upon, so as to reduce the time of trial.
At this hearing each agreed that the date of taking would
Le December 24, 1969 (Tr. 9 line 6). Each further
agreed that no evidence would be offered or any sale of
borrow made, after the date of taking by the defendants
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to contractor's of the State, as borrow was a common
product all along the rights-of-way. There was no record
made of these proceedings, it was just an understanding
and agreed to, as far as counsel was concerned. The first
indication of any variance of this agreement came (Tr.
10 line 9) :
"Q. Now without necessarily going into what
happened to that area, would you just explain,
please, what change appears on the land, and we
won't go into anything else.

A. Okay. This area in here was a slight hill, and
it has been removed for borrowMR. MANN: Now just a minute.
Q. \Vithout going into what happened to the-

THE COURT: It appears different now
than it did before; is that correct?
A. This is correct, yes.
THE COURT: How did it look before?

A. Well this area in here was covered with sagebrush,,
light grass, and of course now this is
gone.
Tr. 10 lines 12 to 21:
"Q. What is the appearance of that land at the
present time where that ridge and that hill was 1

l\1R. MANN: Now, nowTHE COURT: I just now said they'll be
able to see that when they get there.
MR. MANN: \Ve talked about that a few
minutes ago in there.
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MR. EV ANS: I'm not sure what the objection is.
wIR. MANN: 'Ve're talking it as of the 24th
of December, 1969."
Tr. 128 line 30 to Tr. 129 line 25:
"Q. Now is there any point along there now
where the grade is not the same as it was in December of '69?

MR. MANN: Now, if the court please,
we're talking about December of '69, the day of
taking. Whatever is there since has no bearing on
what it was as of that day, and we've discussed
that in chambers and I know what he's leading
into.
l\1R. EYANS: That was my last question.
THE COURT: I don't know what he's
leading into, but I don't see anything wrong with
his question yet.
MANN: Let's read it over.
(The question was read by the reporter.)
A. The grade of the roadway, as I said, is primarily the same as it was in December of '69.
l\IR. MANN: Now, we're still talking about
the roadway. Okay.
Q. On U.S. 30.

A. Ask me another question.
Q. 'Vell, is there any qualification to your statement?
A. This area in here has beenlVLANN: Now, now, now ... that's
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just what I'm trying to get away from. It's just
the same thing you've been advised in chambers
on.
THE COURT: Now if you' re going into
anything about the land itself different than 1969
December 24, the objection is sustained."
'
Again, on page Tr. 199, the attorney for plaintiff, in the
absence of the court and the attorney for defendant, read
into the record the following, lines 11 to 30:
"The state, pursuant to the agreement of the
court, further states for the record the court's
ruling in chambers prior to the trial that evidence
must not be introduced at trial respecting the
changing condition of the defendant's northeast
remainder. Subsequent to the take and without
connection to the take, the defendant, pursuant
to a private contract with the contractor, sold
borrow from his land, reducing what on the date
of take was a hillside to a large hole in the ground.
By way of proffer of proof, the plaintiff indicated to the court that it intended to have testimony concerning the difference in the appearance of the land as of the date of take from that as
it was viewed by the jury on the first day of trial.
And, further, the total number of yards which
had been removed as evidence of the change in
the land unrelated to the state's construction.
These matters the court indicated were not to be
admitted, notwithstanding the plaintiff's agreement to the fact that the money paid the defendant for the removal of the borrow was inadmissible and that the state had no intention of trying
to place that into evidence."
I believe the record can be searched carefully and
you will not find any offer of proof by plaintiff, or an
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attempt to make a record of such in regard to the sale of
borrow by defendants to the contractor. This same matter has come up before in other pre-trails and counsel
haYe in the past agreed that the sale of fill along the
right-of-way was common to all people along the rightof-way and that the building of the right-of-way had not
created a special benefit to the defendant so that the state
was entitled to an offset against damages.
The attorney for plaintiff agreed, as shown in his
statement (Tr. 199) that he had stipulated the amount
of money could not be shown, but he wanted to obtain,
indirectly, with secret intentions, what he could not get
directly and he tried on every turn to get before the jury
that there had been a sale and wanted to get the amount
of yards into the record. I ask the question, why?-when
he had openly admitted that he could not get before the
jury the amount of money for the sale but he wanted to
show everything else but this. It could be for no other
reason than he wanted them to speculate and give the
great State of Utah a credit by such speculation. His
agreement as shown Tr. 199 beginning with line 26, is
this, as stated in his own words:
" ... These matters the court indicated were not
to be admitted, notwithstanding the plaintiff's
agreement to the fact that the money paid the defendant for the removal of the borrow was inadmissible and that the state had no intention of
trying to place that into evidence."
The above statement should terminate the need to
discuss Point IY further.
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CONCLUSION
The State did not like the small verdict on severance
damages, less the special benefits, making a total of
$2500.00 and so it appealed. The value of the land and
improvements have been stipulated. The State, with unlimited taxpayer resources filed a 56 page brief. The
landowner must file his. If this verdict is sustained, more
than half of the award has already been eaten up in expenses. This kind of procedure makes a mockery of the
Constitution which guarantees that private property
shall not be taken for public benefit without just compensation. While I have no legal authority for it equity
dictates that the defendants should be allowed reasonable
attorneys fees on appeal as a matter of justice as part of
their costs.
This case was tried fairly before a jury who returned what 7 of the 8 jurors believed was a fair or just
verdict. The verdict should be sustained and defendants
awarded their costs which should include reasonable attorneys fees.
Respectfully submitted,
WALTER G. JVIANN
Of Mann and Hadfield,
Attorneys for defendants Larkin.
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